

03 MDL 1570 (GBD)

FIONA HAVLISH, in her own right
and as Executrix of the ESTATE OF
DONALD G. HAVLISH, JR., Deceased, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

USAMA BIN LADEN,

AL QAEDA/ISLAMIC ARMY,
an unincorporated association, *et al*

FOREIGN STATE DEFENDANTS,

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
ALI AKBAR HASHEMI RAFSANJANI
Previously Identified and Served as
Unidentified Terrorist 1,

IRANIAN MINISTRY OF
INFORMATION AND SECURITY,

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY
GUARD CORPS,

HEZBOLLAH,
an unincorporated association,

THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM,

THE NATIONAL IRANIAN :
TANKER CORPORATION :
Previously identified as Unidentified Terrorist 2, :

THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL CORPORATION,

: CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CV-9848 -RCC
: Case Transferred from the United
: States District Court for the
: District of Columbia
: Case Number 1:02CV00305

**AFFIDAVIT OF
DANIEL L. BYMAN**

THE NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY :
Previously Identified as Unidentified Terrorist 4, :
: :
IRAN AIRLINES :
Previously Identified as Unidentified Terrorist 5, :
: :
THE NATIONAL IRANIAN :
PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY :
Previously Identified as Unidentified Terrorist 6, :
: :
IRANIAN MINISTRY OF :
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE :
IRANIAN MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, :
: :
IRANIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE :
AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS, :
: :
THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE :
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, *et al.* :
Previously Identified as Unidentified Terrorist 7, :
: :
Defendants. :

AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN

I, **Daniel L. Byman**, being duly sworn, do hereby swear and affirm under penalty of perjury that the contents of this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Qualifications of the Expert Witness

1. My name is Daniel L. Byman. I am an adult citizen of the United States and reside in the State of Maryland.
2. I have been working on issues related to the Middle East, terrorism, and national security for over 20 years.
3. I began my professional career as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency,

where I worked from 1990 until 1993. At the CIA, I examined the politics and security situations of several Middle East countries, including Iran. I did considerable work on Iran's relationships with its neighbors and with various radical and terrorist groups. While at the CIA, I received two exceptional performance awards for my work.

4. I went from the CIA to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where I studied for my Ph.D. My dissertation, later published, involved research on Iran's domestic policies as well as on the Middle East in general.

5. Beginning in 1995 during my dissertation work and after completing my Ph.D. in 1997, I worked at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. as a policy analyst. RAND is a non-profit federally funded research and development center designed to do research in the public interest. For several years I was also the research director of RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy.

6. While at RAND, my work examined a range of U.S. national security issues, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East. I did several studies that looked at terrorism problems in the Middle East, Iran's foreign policy and relationship with its neighbors, and the problems coming from the newly emergent regime in Afghanistan – the Taliban. During this time I worked closely with various branches of the U.S. military, the U.S. intelligence community, and other government agencies. A full list of my unclassified publications from this time can be found in my *curriculum vitae*, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

7. I left RAND in 2002, where I joined the House and Senate Intelligence Committees in their joint investigation of the intelligence community's performance regarding the 9/11 terrorist attacks (the so-called "9/11 Inquiry"). I was one of four team leaders for this effort. For the Committees, I spent considerable time examining al-Qa'ida's history, U.S.

counterterrorism policy, and the nature of the jihadist adversary. Much of this examination consisted of interviewing U.S. government and other experts working on terrorism and counterterrorism, and reviewing thousands of pages of documents on these subjects.

8. I continued doing similar work when I joined the staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, better known as the “9/11 Commission.” For the Commission, my work focused on U.S. counterterrorism policy, with a particular emphasis on al-Qa’ida operations and U.S. attempts to counter them throughout the Middle East. I reviewed numerous documents and conducted many interviews, building on the past work I had done with the 9/11 Inquiry. For both the 9/11 Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission, I traveled to the Middle East to interview officials there.

9. While doing work for the 9/11 Commission, I joined the permanent faculty at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in 2003. In 2005, I became the Director of Georgetown’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and the associated masters’ program in security studies, the largest of its kind and considered by many to be one of, if not the, world’s top program. I teach classes on terrorism, Middle East security, and other topics related to U.S. national security.

10. In addition to my professorship and responsibilities at Georgetown University, in 2003 I joined the Brookings Institution, a leading non-partisan think tank, as a senior fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. At Brookings my work has focused on terrorism and Middle East security. I do considerable work for Brookings on Iran and on al-Qa’ida.

11. In addition to my formal positions at Georgetown and Brookings, I am a regular consultant to the U.S. government and various corporations on terrorism- and national security-related matters.

12. I have written dozens of articles for peer-reviewed academic journals and policy journals (e.g., *Foreign Affairs*), as well as short pieces for *The Atlantic Monthly*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, and other leading magazines and newspapers. A full list of these articles is given in my *curriculum vitae*, but I will note here that many of them focus on Iran and al-Qa'ida, both in the past and today. I have done several classified studies on these topics that are not listed in my *vitae*. I am regularly quoted in the media, though several years ago I largely stopped doing television.

13. Several of my books focus on issues related to this Affidavit. In 2005, my book *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* was published by Cambridge University Press. One of the book's sections focuses on Iran and its relationship with the Lebanese Hizballah, and a second examines the Taliban's relationship with al-Qa'ida. In 2008, my book *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* came out with Wiley and Sons. The book examines the nature of al-Qa'ida today, the success and failures of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and ways to move forward against this danger. I am finishing my next book, *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism*, which Oxford University Press will publish in early 2011. Several of the chapters address Israel's confrontation with the Iran-backed Lebanese Hizballah.

I. Bottom Line: Summary of Expert Opinion

14. It is my professional judgment that there is clear and convincing evidence that Iran has provided material support for al-Qa'ida in general as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section

2339A(b)(1). This assistance predated the 9/11 attack and continued after it, and it had profound implications for the 9/11 attack itself. Over the years this support has included assistance with travel, a limited safe haven, and some training at the very least. It is quite possible that there was additional, and far more considerable, support as well – Iran has deliberately kept its relationship with al-Qa'ida shrouded and ambiguous, so a more definitive judgment is impossible using the sources available to me.

II. Iran's Support for Terrorism

15. The United States Department of State has designated Iran a major state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, and Iran has remained prominent on the U.S. list since that time. Most recently, in its annual report on terrorism that came out in 2009, the State Department found that “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s involvement in the planning and financial support of terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia had a direct impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in the Gulf, and undermined the growth of democracy.”¹ The State Department went on to list Iranian support for groups as diverse as the Palestinian Hamas and anti-U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the State Department, Iran has a particularly close relationship with the Lebanese Hizballah, giving it more than \$200 million and training 3,000 of its fighters in Iran. Other estimates, given to me privately in meetings with senior Israeli officials and analysts, are much higher.

16. The State Department also notes Iran’s continuing indirect backing of al-Qa'ida: “Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa'ida members it has detained, and has refused to publicly identify those senior members in its custody. Iran has repeatedly resisted

¹ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008* (April 30, 2009), available at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122436.htm>.

numerous calls to transfer custody of its al-Qa'ida detainees to their countries of origin or third countries for trial. Iran also continued to fail to control the activities of some al-Qa'ida members who fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”² I will discuss my views of these points in more detail below.

III. Iranian Motivations for Supporting Terrorism and Militancy

17. Historically, Iran has supported terrorism for several reasons. Initially, the most important motivation was ideology: after Ayatollah Khomeini took power following the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran sought to spread its Islamic revolution to the rest of the Muslim world. So Iran backed a range of like-minded groups in the Arabian peninsula, Iraq, and especially Lebanon – where it helped found and nurture the Lebanese Hizballah.

18. Over the years, these efforts to foment revolution largely failed, and many of these groups collapsed or had little impact (the Lebanese Hizballah being an important exception). The Iranian regime often continued relationships with these groups, however, out of ideological solidarity.³ Most of these groups were composed of Shi'a Muslims, who were particularly electrified by the success of revolutionary Shiism in Iran. Many devout and politically active Sunni Muslims had a more ambivalent view: they admired the general concept of religious activism, but they did not accept the religious teachings of Shiism or of Khomeini.

19. Strategic concerns also came to the fore, particularly as the Islamic Republic acquired enemies as it tried to spread its revolutionary gospel. So Iran used terrorist and militant groups against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, and other enemies.

² U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008* (April 30, 2009), available at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122436.htm>.

³ A further description of Iran's motivations can be found in my book *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

By fostering instability, Iran hoped to topple the neighboring governments or, if that failed, force them to devote troops and resources to combating the unrest.

20. Iran also reached out to groups beyond the Shi'a community. At times this was simply power politics: Iran worked to foment unrest among Iraqi Kurds, just as Saddam Hussein worked to foment unrest among Iranian Kurds. In the 1990s, however, Iran began to forge strong relationships with Palestinian Islamist groups, particularly Palestine Islamic Jihad but also, to a lesser degree, Hamas.

21. For Iran, such relationships served a strategic purpose in weakening its adversary, Israel, and undermining the U.S.-led effort to isolate Iran. Fighting Israel's enemies by promoting Palestinian groups was also good politics given the cachet that the Palestinian cause enjoys in the Muslim world. At the same time, Iran saw this as an ideological necessity: Israel, in Tehran's eyes, was an abomination, and ties to Sunni groups helped Iran with its claim that it was a Muslim and revolutionary power, not one tied exclusively to the Shi'a Muslim community.

22. Often Iran has multiple motives when backing a particular group. General David Petraeus, who currently heads U.S. military forces in the Middle East, testified that Iran "employs surrogates and violent proxies" with goals as diverse as weakening rivals and frustrating efforts to stabilize Iraq.⁴

IV. Specific Motivations Regarding Iran's Support for Sunni Jihadists and al-Qa'ida

23. Beyond the general motivations that apply to Tehran's relations with other terrorist groups, Iran has several reasons for working with al-Qa'ida and other Sunni jihadist movements in particular. First, Iran has long tried to bridge the Shi'a-Sunni divide. This is both for strategic reasons – many of Iran's neighbors and the Middle East in general are Sunni-

⁴ Statement of General David H. Petraeus, Commander U.S. Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2010.

dominated and Iran seeks influence and stature with their peoples – and because Iran sees itself as the leader of the Muslim world and a revolutionary power that transcends sectarian differences.

24. In 1991-1992, the chief ideologue of Sudan, Hasan al-Turabi, also sought to bridge this gap to fight what he saw as the enemies of Islam, such as the United States and its allies in the Arab world such as Egypt. Turabi's Sudan became a home to Sunni militants from around the world, and his government brokered meetings with Iran to help militants receive training. Under Turabi's protection, al-Qa'ida was based in Sudan from 1992 to 1996. During this time, al-Qa'ida and Iranian officials met in Sudan, according to a senior al-Qa'ida figure later arrested and tried in the United States.⁵

25. A second reason for cooperation is that Iran, like al-Qa'ida, sees the United States as its enemy. Beyond the 9/11 attacks, al-Qa'ida has carried out other devastating strikes on the United States, notably the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa that killed over 200 people, including 12 Americans, and the 2000 attack on *USS Cole* that killed 17 American seamen. Iran, for its part, is believed to be behind the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 Americans in Saudi Arabia and worked with the Lebanese Hizballah in its 1983 attacks on the U.S. embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed over 300 people. This bloody toll reflects Iran's and al-Qa'ida's similar view of the United States. Both believe the United States is an imperialistic power bent on subjugating Muslims and want to weaken its influence. Iran and al-Qa'ida also have other foes in common, including pro-Western Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iran's relationship towards these countries has vacillated from outright hostility and calls for such regimes to be overthrown to efforts toward conciliation, but the use of violence and the threat of force have been part of its foreign policy towards these states. In short,

⁵ *United States of America vs. Ali Mohamed*, Plea, October 20, 2000, p.28.

while Iran and al-Qa'ida often have wildly different goals regarding many issues, they both want to weaken and hurt many of the same adversaries.

26. Indirectly but clearly, al-Qa'ida has admitted that some relationship existed with Iran before 9/11, and al-Qa'ida justified this on the basis of strategic commonality. In 2008, the number two leader of al-Qa'ida, Ayman Zawahiri was interviewed by the al-Qa'ida news organization *As-Sahab*. In that interview, he admitted that before 9/11, Iran and al-Qa'ida worked together "on confronting the American-led Zionist/Crusader alliance." Dr. Saad al-Faqih, who heads a Saudi opposition movement based in London and whom the United States alleges is affiliated with al-Qa'ida, similarly pointed out that although there are huge differences between Iran and al-Qa'ida "they had common interests in opposing America."⁶

27. This shared opposition to the United States contributed to cooperation after 9/11 as well. In Iraq after the 2003 invasion, Iran and al-Qa'ida both wanted to make sure that the United States was bloodied and lost any enthusiasm for military intervention in the Muslim world. Al-Qa'ida inspired, trained, funded, and facilitated the travel of fighters who wanted to conduct *jihad* against the United States and its local allies in Iraq. Iran, in turn, armed, trained, financed, and otherwise supported militias that were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of U.S. soldiers, as well as thousands of Iraqis.⁷ Both organizations usually backed different – and opposed – groups in Iraq, but both their local allies often opposed the United States.

28. A third reason for cooperation is that ties to al-Qa'ida and other jihadists, like ties to terrorist groups in general, give Iran options for possible or even unforeseen contingencies. In its relationship with Saudi Arabia today, for example, Iran is no longer calling for the overthrow

⁶ Mahan Abedin, "The Essence of Al Qaeda: An Interview with Saad al-Faqih," *Spotlight on Terror*, vol. 2, no. 2, February 5, 2004.

⁷ See the exchange between General David Petraeus and Senator Joseph Lieberman in "To Receive Testimony on the Situation in Iraq and Progress Made by the Government of Iraq in Meeting Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation," U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 8, 2008, p. 30.

of the Al Saud leadership but remains a rival to Riyadh. Should the relationship worsen, Iran would like the option of working with anti-regime Sunni jihadists. Such options are often tactical as well. For example, Iran reportedly contracted with an al-Qa'ida-linked organization in Iraq to kill the U.S. Ambassador there: this does not appear to have been a sustained relationship, but simply a one-off bit of cooperation with this particular organization.⁸

29. A fourth reason is that having al-Qa'ida operatives in the country under Tehran's supervision gives Iran a bargaining chip. After 9/11, and before the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, hundreds of al Qaeda members, including many key al Qaeda leaders, and their families, fled Afghanistan and were permitted to enter and stay in Iran. *See* ¶¶51-59, *infra*. Accordingly, with all of those al Qaeda members and their families under its control, Iran can loosen its restrictions on al-Qa'ida operatives in the country and facilitate their travel if it wants to stir the pot in Afghanistan or Iraq or against the United States; on the other hand, it can constrain their mobility or even surrender them if it wants to improve relations with Washington or with al-Qa'ida's Arab foes.

30. In particular, Iran also seeks the return of members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iran terrorist group that was long based out of Iraq. Although the United States considers the MEK a terrorist organization, it granted the MEK's members in Iraq the status of "protected persons" under the Geneva Convention and has not sent them to Iran.⁹ For Iran, holding al-Qa'ida members is a possible point of exchange with the United States for the MEK members.¹⁰

⁸ "The Iran Connection," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 22, 2004.

⁹ Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses," Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2010, p. 13.

¹⁰ Robert Windrem, "Al-Qaida reportedly finds safe haven in Iran," *MSNBC.com*, June 24, 2005

31. Fifth, Iran has successfully used the al-Qa'ida members resident in Iran to ensure good behavior from the broader Sunni jihadist movement. As noted below, parts of the broader jihadist movement of which al-Qa'ida is a member are often violently hostile to Iran and to Shiite Muslims, and Iran seeks a hedge against their hostility. Zawahiri, in internal correspondence with the leader of al-Qa'ida of Iraq that was made public by the United States, urged the leader not to target the Shi'a in Iraq and Iranian assets because Iran holds over 100 al-Qa'ida members in the country and they are vulnerable to Iranian pressure.¹¹

32. From al-Qa'ida's point of view, the logic of Iranian help is even more straightforward. Although al-Qa'ida is a formidable terrorist organization, it lacks the resources of a major state like Iran. Al-Qa'ida's haven in Afghanistan before 9/11, and today in more remote parts of Pakistan, make it difficult for it to bring fighters and other personnel to and from its base to the broader Muslim and Western world where it seeks to be active. Having the ability to transit via Iran is thus exceptionally useful. In addition, al-Qa'ida's capabilities, especially in the past, were limited, and assistance from Iran could improve the organization's capabilities. Some degree of a haven is also vital for al-Qa'ida, as it needs respite from U.S. and allied efforts to arrest and kill its members.

V. Problems in the Relationship Lead to Quiet Cooperation

33. Iran and al-Qa'ida have had a contentious relationship at times; these problems mirror Iran's broader problems with the Sunni jihadist movement. Many Sunnis, particularly within the jihadist wing, see the Shi'a as apostates. As such, they are in many ways the most

¹¹ Shmuel Bar & Yair Minzili, "The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, January 2006.

hated enemy: worse even than Americans and Jews. At times this has led to massacres and other abuses of Shi'a who are misfortunate enough to live under or come across Sunni jihadists.

34. Not surprisingly, within this community there is also tremendous hostility toward Iran, the most powerful Shi'a country. The root of this hostility is religious and communal, but at times has profound political consequences. Al-Qa'ida has consistently contended that there has been no modern government in the Muslim world that is truly an Islamic government. The exception they make to this is the anti-Iran Taliban, not the Islamic Republic of Iran: the jihadists reject its very legitimacy. Over the years, in countries like Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, the proxies of Iran and al-Qa'ida's allies have at times murdered one another -- though it is unclear if either Tehran or the al-Qa'ida leadership sanctioned this -- adding a personal dimension to the theological disagreement.

35. Some groups that share views with al-Qa'ida on many issues have even attacked Iran itself. One terrorist group Iran faces is Jundullah, a relatively small Sunni Muslim group based out of the Baluchistan region of Pakistan. In recent years, Jundullah has repeatedly struck at Iranian security personnel, claiming revenge for Iran's mistreatment of Sunnis.¹² This is not the only Sunni radical group to have struck Iran itself. In 1994, Sunni jihadists reportedly attacked the shrine of Imam Reza in the Iranian city of Mashad; the operation was carried out by Ramzi Yousef, who was also responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and a relative of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.¹³ In the late 1990s, the anti-

¹² Katzman, "Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses," p. 14.

¹³ Mahan Abedin, "The Essence of Al Qaeda: An Interview with Saad al-Faqih," *Spotlight on Terror*, Vol. 2, no. 2, February 5, 2004; Paul Hastert, "Al Qaeda and Iran: Friends or Foes, or Somewhere in Between?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, no. 30 (2007), p. 329.

regime Sunni Iranian group Ahl-e-Sunnah Wal Jammat operated out of the Afghan border area near Iran.¹⁴

36. Hostility between the two communities came to a head during the Iraqi civil war, when Iran backed local Shi'a groups primarily and al-Qa'ida supported Sunni organizations, many of which came together as "al-Qa'ida of Iraq," that went on a murderous rampage against Iraqi Shi'a while the Iranian-backed groups did bloody raids of their own. Tens of thousands died in this fighting. Al-Qa'ida and other Sunni jihadists believe that Iran and the United States colluded in Iraq to put the Shi'a in charge and are otherwise working together. Even today, when civil strife has died down, there are numerous mutterings in the jihadist community against "Safavids" (the name of the Iranian empire of the 17th century, which converted Iran from Sunnism to Shiism).¹⁵

37. The relationship between Iran and al-Qa'ida's primary patron from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, was even more acrimonious. The Taliban were exceptionally hostile to Iran and to Afghan Shiites, and in 1998 the two regimes almost went to war after a massacre of Shiites in Afghanistan that also led to the deaths of several Iranian government officials there. Iran provided arms and money to the anti-Taliban "Northern Alliance" resistance movement, and the Taliban believed that once they won the country's civil war they would then fight Iran.¹⁶

38. Given this tension and violence, it is no surprise that al-Qa'ida leaders have at times bitterly denounced Iran. After the United States went to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks – and when Iran tacitly cooperated with U.S. efforts – Zawahiri publicly blasted Tehran for siding with the United States and denounced the "Iranian-

¹⁴ Hastert, "Al Qaeda and Iran," p. 330.

¹⁵ Bruce Riedel, *The Search for Al-Qaeda* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2008), p. 124.

¹⁶ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 339-340.

Crusader alliance.” He declared in a statement in *As-Sahab* that after years of cooperation before 9/11, “All of a sudden, we discovered Iran collaborating with America” and that “Iran stabbed the Muslim ‘*Ummah* [community, in this context] in its back.”¹⁷

39. For both sides, but particularly for al-Qa’ida, this sort of antagonism leads it to try to downplay its relationship with Iran. For example, after the 2000 attack on *USS Cole*, Iran tried to strengthen ties to al-Qa’ida: a move that Usama bin Ladin was said by an al Qaeda detainee to have rebuffed because he did not want to alienate anti-Iran supporters in Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ Al-Qa’ida cares tremendously about recruiting, and it would suffer considerably if potential recruits and donors learned it had a close relationship with the hated Shi’a Iranians. Instead, al-Qa’ida prefers to cultivate an image of steadfast resistance and naturally does not want to draw any attention to alliances of convenience it may create.¹⁹

40. For Iran, the incentives for keeping the relationship quiet are different but no less profound. Iran has an antagonistic relationship with many powers, especially the United States, but it still seeks trade, investment, and other forms of contact with the broader world. As al-Qa’ida opposes not only the United States but also other Western countries, supporting it would bring the enmity of countries whose goodwill Iran seeks. Even with regard to the United States, Iran wants to avoid an open conflict that, given the military disparity, would not be to Iran’s advantage. Tehran also fears a tightening of economic restrictions, which would worsen the already considerable limits on economic activity facing the country. In addition, many Iranians abhor the Sunni jihadist community for its anti-Shi’a words and deeds, and as such any alliance

¹⁷ For a partial transcript that gives the quote, see

<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers26%5Cpaper2529.html>

¹⁸ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 240. Note that all references to this report refer to the hardcover version.

¹⁹ Hastert, “Al Qaeda and Iran,” p. 334.

would be politically unpopular. Quiet cooperation – and cooperation that involves looking the other way rather than open support – is preferred by both sides.

VI. An Alliance of Convenience

41. There are many differences between Iran and al-Qa'ida that make it a difficult partnership, but in the end Iran and, to a lesser degree, al-Qa'ida can be ruthlessly pragmatic, cutting deals with potential future adversaries to advance their cause in the short-term. As Columbia University scholar of Islamist movements Michael Doran contends, “bin Laden has no intention of going down in a blaze of glory.” He argues instead that for bin Ladin “the gravity of the situation requires al Qaeda to pursue its interests by any means available; conventional morality impinges on its political thought only with regard to its utility in manipulating others.”²⁰ As analysts Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili indicate, even Zawahiri, who is considered more doctrinaire than bin Ladin, wanted to delay the conflict with the Shi'a until the short-term goal of defeating the United States is met.²¹ For these leaders, the reasons to keep cooperation with Iran at a low profile are primarily driven by a fear of losing recruits, money, and prestige rather than a deep-seated antipathy toward working with a Shi'a power.

42. The clerical regime also has shown a willingness to ally with groups it considers enemies for short-term advantage. In its bitter war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran worked with Israel and the United States to obtain much-needed spare parts for its weapons systems (which led to the “Iran-*contra*” scandal). After the war ended, Tehran cooperated with its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, to smuggle out Iraqi oil and otherwise benefit economically. In neither case did this lead to an end of hostility towards these regimes, but it suggests how common strange

²⁰ Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 117, no. 2 (2002), p. 182.

²¹ Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (January 2006).

bedfellows are in this world. General Petraeus has recently pointed out not only Iran's considerable support for violent actors in Iraq but also its "opportunistic support" to the Taliban – the regime against which Iran almost went to war in 1998 -- even as Iran more publicly works with the pro-U.S. Karzai regime.²² U.S. Treasury officials are a bit more specific, testifying to the flow of weapons and money to the Taliban.²³ Given the tension, at times hatred, that characterized Iran's relationship with the Taliban in the past, this testifies as to how opportunism and short-term common enmity often trump other concerns of Tehran.

43. Because of this pragmatism, the Sunni-Shi'a split and the jihadist hostility toward Iran does not prevent tactical cooperation. As noted above, Iran has sought to rise above Sunni-Shi'a differences, and several Sunni leaders have also done so. Also, as noted above, there are other reasons for cooperation that at times transcend this divide. In addition, there are many Sunni Arabs who focus on common interests, not sectarian identity. However, the Sunni-Shi'a divide hinders a close alliance and creates constant suspicion.

VII. Use of Hizballah as a Cutout

44. In many of its operations involving terrorist groups, Iran uses Hizballah as a facilitator. Hizballah plays this role for several reasons. First, Iran's involvement in Hizballah's creation, large-scale funding, constant provision of training, and role in Hizballah's leadership councils has given Iran an important role in the Lebanese organization. Iran trusts Hizballah and Hizballah trusts Iran – one of the closest relationships in history between a terrorist group and its sponsor.²⁴ Second, although Hizballah is a Shi'a organization, it is an Arab group, while Iran is a Persian state. As such, Hizballah has stature in the Arab nationalist community and can better

²² Statement of General David H. Petraeus.

²³ Statement of Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey before the Senate Committee on Finance, April 1, 2008.

²⁴ For more on this, see Byman, *Deadly Connections*.

bridge the Shi'a-Sunni divide because it is not also suspect due to a difference in ethnicity.

Indeed, according to some polls, Hizballah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, is the single most popular individual in the Arab world because of his organization's repeated and successful defiance of Israel. Third, Hizballah is highly capable and has a high degree of independence in Lebanon. Thus the training offered at Hizballah camps is superb, and it can be done without having to hide it from the Lebanese government. Finally, working through Hizballah offers Iran some degree of deniability if it chooses, as it places one more degree of separation between the group in question and Iran.

VIII. Three Types of Support

45. In my judgment Iran has provided material support to al-Qa'ida before and after 9/11 in three different forms: travel assistance, a safe haven, and training. It is possible that Iran's support has gone beyond this, perhaps well beyond, but in my judgment data are not conclusive beyond these three forms. Specificity on the level of Iranian support is difficult. As former CIA official and terrorism expert Bruce Riedel puts it, "This has been a dark, a black zone for us."²⁵ Nevertheless, over the years a range of reports indicate that Iran has an established relationship with al-Qa'ida and that at times Tehran has given the organization and its allies considerable backing. Without such support conducting the 9/11 operations and other terrorist attacks would have been more difficult. In addition, Iran's provision of a limited safe haven has hindered post-9/11 efforts to bring al-Qa'ida members to justice and stop future attacks.

²⁵ As quoted in Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, "Iran eases grip on al-Qaida," *Associated Press*, May 13, 2010. *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 60. As the 9/11 Commission Report notes, despite the official view that Iran was solely behind the Khobar Towers bombing, there are signs that al-Qa'ida also played some role in the attack.

1. Travel Assistance

46. Perhaps the most important form of aid Iran gave al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11 (and continues to give today) involves the facilitation of travel. In particular, in the months before 9/11 Iranian border inspectors were deliberately told to look the other way and not stamp passports of jihadists going to and from Afghanistan. Keeping such passports "clean" was vital to reducing the risk of discovery and arrest in Saudi Arabia and later the United States. The 9/11 Commission found that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi hijackers who provided "muscle" for the 9/11 operation transited Iran between October 2000 and February 2001. Also in 2000, a Hizballah operative went to Saudi Arabia to help arrange travel for jihadists via Iran, and travel facilitation also occurred via Beirut, where Hizballah is headquartered.²⁶

47. Other sources corroborate this assistance, offer additional details, and suggest that before 9/11, Iran had become perhaps the most important route into Afghanistan and al-Qa'ida's training camps there.²⁷ The U.S. Treasury reports that in the mid-1990s al-Qa'ida operative Mustafa Hamid negotiated a secret relationship with Iran that allowed safe transit via Iran to Afghanistan.²⁸ After Pakistan began to tighten up transit routes in the years before 9/11, one of al-Qa'ida's key military commanders, Seif al-Adl, told an interviewer that al-Qa'ida began "building good relations with some virtuous people in Iran to pave the way [for travel] and coordinate issues of mutual interest."²⁹ The al-Qa'ida-linked Saudi dissident al-Faqih noted that "before 9/11 many Saudis used Iran to access Afghanistan" because "the Iranians kept a blind eye to this."³⁰

²⁶ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 240.

²⁷ Hastert, "Al Qaeda and Iran," p. 333.

²⁸ "Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran," U.S. Department of Treasury, January 16, 2009.

²⁹ Fu'ad Husayn interview of Seif al-Adl, "Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qaeda," *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, May 21, 2005.

³⁰ Mahan Abedin, "The Essence of Al Qaeda: An Interview with Saad al-Faqih," *Spotlight on Terror*, vol. 2, no. 2, February 5, 2004.

48. This travel assistance has continued on and off since 9/11 (see the important caveats noted below under safe haven). Between 2004 and 2007, Adel Muhammad Mahmoud Abdulkhaleq, who is a terrorist affiliated with both al-Qa'ida and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, went to Iran five times on behalf of these organizations. Suspected al-Qa'ida terrorists active in Bahrain also went via Iran to Afghanistan.³¹ Iran continues such facilitation to this day. General Petraeus notes that "Additionally, al-Qaeda continues to use Iran as a key facilitation hub, where facilitators connect al-Qaeda's senior leadership to regional affiliates." Iran, he contends, disrupts this network from time to time, but Iranian policy in the end is "unpredictable" in his judgment.³² In 2010, Iran appears to be easing the house arrest and other movement restrictions it had imposed intermittently since 2003. Press reporting citing intelligence officials indicates that al-Qa'ida operatives detained in Iran are now allowed to move in and out of the country.³³

49. Travel assistance seems to have consisted largely of deliberately turning a blind eye to individuals transiting Iran and ensuring that others in the Iranian system, particularly border personnel, did so as well. Thus, rather than Iranian government officials being directly implicated in a particular act, in my judgment the government is implicated by what it did not do: a deliberate policy of neglect that allowed al-Qa'ida members to transit Iran. When neglect was not enough (such as at the border), instructions were made more explicit. At times Hezbollah officials were brought in to assist as well. For instance, as noted in the 9/11 Commission Report, page 240, direct involvement by Hezbollah officials occurs; in October 2000, the Senior Operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate activities there. He also planned

³¹ Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, "The Iran-al-Qaeda Conundrum," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Policywatch* 1461, January 23, 2009.

³² Statement of General David H. Petraeus, Commander U.S. Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2010.

³³ Goldman and Apuzzo, "Iran eases grip on al-Qaida".

to assist individuals in Saudi Arabia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah commander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved.

50. Such travel assistance is invaluable for groups like al-Qa'ida. If visas had an Iranian stamp or showed a link to Afghanistan, they would be far more likely to attract the attention of border security officials in Saudi Arabia, the United States, or other countries that are hostile to al-Qa'ida. In addition, established lines of transit make recruitment and training easier, as individuals can travel to and from training camps without fear of interference. This is particularly important for facilitating the flow of new recruits, who lack training in clandestine travel. Finally, travel facilitation enables better communication and coordination among the far-flung strands of the global jihad of which al-Qa'ida is a part. Particularly after 9/11, but even before, al-Qa'ida and its affiliate groups were aware that the United States and other hostile powers monitored phones and other forms of communication and recognized that many sensitive deliberations are best done face-to-face. Doing so, however, requires individuals who can travel freely from one area to another.

2. Safe Haven

51. Before 9/11, different terrorist groups used Iran as a meeting point. In the 1990s, for example, Iran would host summits of terrorist groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process as a way of highlighting its leadership of the so-called "rejectionist" camp. Beyond such publicity moves, different groups would meet in Iran to plan various activities and improve coordination. Jessica Stern, a respected terrorism expert who teaches at Harvard University, recalls from her interviews in Pakistan in early 1999 that Sunni jihadists there would fundraise in Iran and would meet operatives from other organizations such as Hizballah there.³⁴ After al-

³⁴ "Interview: Jessica Stern and Gary Sick talk about Iran and Its Relationship with al-Qaeda," transcript of National Public Radio's "All Things Considered," July 24, 2004.

Qa'ida was forced out of Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, much of the leadership went to Pakistan. However, an important segment went to Iran.

52. After 9/11, Iran moved to limit the safe haven, sending many suspected jihadists to their home countries, where they usually faced arrest. For a while, this appeared to be a massive shift. Iran strongly supported the U.S. war against the hated Taliban and even gave promises of limited assistance to the U.S. military effort, such as assistance with possible search and rescue missions. Iran also worked positively to stabilize the new, post-Taliban Hamid Karzai regime in the months after he took power.³⁵ Briefly, it seemed that Iran was moving away from its support for terrorism, particularly when it came to groups like al-Qa'ida.

53. Since January 2002, after President George W. Bush publicly declared Iran part of the "Axis of Evil" in his State of the Union address (a decision motivated, in part, by Iran's supplying weapons to Palestinian groups using terrorism against Israel), Iran reduced its efforts to control and extradite senior al-Qa'ida members.³⁶ After 9/11, the United States repeatedly pushed Iran to return suspected al-Qa'ida members to their countries of origin where they would face trial or arrest. According to Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who negotiated indirectly with Iran after 9/11, Iran's surrender of al-Qa'ida figures in Iran was "on the table" until the President's speech.³⁷ As a message to the United States, Iran released the anti-U.S. Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, allowing him to go back from Afghanistan to fight. Now it seemed Iran was using al-Qa'ida both as a carrot and as a stick. As Crocker points out, "Iranians often take

³⁵ Gary Sick, "Iran: Confronting Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003), p. 90.

³⁶ Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses," Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2010, p. 39.

³⁷ Christopher Dickey, "Al Qaeda's Pandora," *Newsweek*, January 5, 2010.

hostages as speculative commodities without necessarily having a clear idea how they will use them.”³⁸

54. In the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Iran felt threatened by the imminence of the U.S. invasion of its neighbor and talking of regime change against “rogue” regimes in the Middle East, Tehran allowed Sunni jihadists to use the country as a base to prepare resistance to U.S. forces in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who at first was a jihadist not directly under al-Qa’ida’s control but with close ties to the organization (and he became the leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq), would go to Iran to meet the senior al-Qa’ida figure Seif al-Adl, who was living there.³⁹ Iran’s proximity to Iraq made it vital to jihadists preparing to fight U.S. forces there.

55. Iran’s policy since that time involved a mix of crackdowns and permissiveness. Seif al-Adl claims that because of U.S. demands, after Iran released Hekmatyar in 2002, Iranian pressure “confused us and aborted 75 percent of our plan” and that there were many arrests – suggesting a positive Iranian role at this time.⁴⁰ Yet al-Qa’ida members living in Iran reportedly orchestrated, or at least were in communication with, individuals in Saudi Arabia who attacked housing areas where foreigners lived in Saudi Arabia on May 12, 2003, which killed 35 people, including 8 Americans. Some press reports have U.S. officials pointing the finger directly at Seif al-Adl.⁴¹

³⁸ Christopher Dickey, “Al Qaeda’s Pandora,” *Newsweek*, January 5, 2010.

³⁹ Gary Gambill, “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch,” *Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 2, no. 24 (December 15, 2004).

⁴⁰ Fu’ad Husayn interview of Seif al-Adl.

⁴¹ Bill Geertz, “CIA Points to Continuing Iran Tie to Al Qaeda,” *Washington Times*, July 23, 2004; Windrem, “Al-Qaida reportedly finds safe haven in Iran;” Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Suggests a Qaeda Cell in Iran Directed Saudi Bombings,” *New York Times*, May 20, 2003; Dana Priest and Susan Schmidt, “Al Qaeda Figure Tied to Riyadh Blasts,” *Washington Post*, May 18, 2003.

56. After the Riyadh bombing, Saudi pressure increased, and Iran claimed it arrested hundreds of al-Qa'ida members.⁴² Iran claimed that it held several senior al-Qa'ida figures in custody, including key operative Seif al-Adl, Shaik Said, a financial officer, spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghaith, and – until 2008, when Iran let him depart – bin Ladin's son Saad, who reportedly went to Pakistan and probably was later killed in 2009 by a US drone strike.⁴³ One U.S. official in 2005 described them as under “virtual house arrest” and subsequent reports indicate that Iran has limited the operatives' ability to travel and communicate.⁴⁴ Since 2003, there are no reports that Iran-based individuals have orchestrated attacks.⁴⁵ Seif al-Adl himself reported in 2005 that, “I have so much free time,”⁴⁶ suggesting that he is not able to play an active role in al-Qa'ida.

57. At the same time, however, Iran has not cracked down fully on al-Qa'ida operatives in the country, either bringing them to justice in Iran or extraditing them to the United States or their home countries. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Treasury designated four al-Qa'ida associates in Tehran under Executive Order 13224, which targets financial activity with those designated – a move described as an effort to highlight Iran's role in providing continued safe haven.⁴⁷

58. Providing a haven, even a highly restricted one, offers many benefits to al-Qa'ida. If the government is not actively seeking to disrupt and arrest terrorist group members, as was the case in Iran regarding al-Qa'ida before 9/11, they can plan and organize attacks with less fear of disruption. Less dramatic, but no less important, a haven also offers a place for relaxation and

⁴² “Iran Says It Made Al Qaeda Arrests,” *Washington Post*, May 26, 2003.

⁴³ “Tehran Pledges to Crack Down on Militants,” *Associated Press*, July 18, 2005.

⁴⁴ Windrem, “Al-Qaida reportedly finds safe haven in Iran”; Jonathan Karl, “Iran in Secret Talks with al Qaeda U.S. Officials Say,” *ABC News*, May 29, 2008.

⁴⁵ Hastert, “Al Qaeda and Iran,” p.333.

⁴⁶ Fu'ad Husayn interview of Seif al-Adl.

⁴⁷ “Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran,” U.S. Department of Treasury, January 16, 2009.

a degree of normalcy: fighters can see their wives and families and otherwise put their guard down. Most important, of course, hostile governments like the United States or its Arab allies cannot reach al-Qa'ida members in such havens. Thus these individuals are not living in constant fear and having to circumscribe their activities for fear of discovery.

59. Iran also houses family members of al-Qa'ida figures. The U.S. Treasury reports that Mustafa Hamid, who orchestrated travel arrangements with Iran in the mid-1990s, also negotiated the effort to relocate some al-Qa'ida families to Iran after the fall of the Taliban.⁴⁸ In 2009, Iran confirmed that one of bin Ladin's daughters was in Iran, and she left for Saudi Arabia in 2010.⁴⁹ Although many of these individuals are not involved in al-Qa'ida, for bin Ladin and other figures not having to worry about their family members removes one point of leverage that Arab regimes use against them. Thus, this shelter inhibits Arab state counterterrorism.

3. Training

60. In the early 1990s, individuals linked to al-Qa'ida received training in explosives in Iran itself. In 1993, more individuals trained in Hizballah facilities in Lebanon – facilities that were set up by Iran and regularly host Iranian paramilitary personnel. This follows Iran's common approach of using both its own people and facilities and “outsourcing” to its close ally Hizballah. The training included explosives training but also instruction on how to collect intelligence and ensure operational security.⁵⁰ Assistance such as this is why the United States accused al-Qa'ida of collaborating with Iran when organization members went on trial for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.⁵¹

⁴⁸ “Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran.”

⁴⁹ Dickey, “Al Qaeda's Pandora.”

⁵⁰ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, pp. 60-61; Testimony of J. T. Caruso, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Statement for the Record on al Qaeda International before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” December 18, 2001.

⁵¹ *United States v. Usama Bin Ladin*, No. 98 Cr. (S.D. N.Y. unsealed November 4, 1998), p. 3.

61. It is difficult to tie the training of particular operatives to particular attacks as we often do not know the details of who learned what at which training session and then went on to do a particular attack. Nevertheless, in general such training makes al-Qa'ida and its allies more formidable. This training was particularly important in the organization's early years, when its operatives had less battle experience and expertise in general.

IX. No Rogue Relationship

62. Support for militant and terrorist groups is often done via Iranian intelligence or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel military force that is tasked with protecting Iran's revolution at home and spreading it abroad, among other duties. The IRGC has always worked closely with Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Many of Iran's current political elite come from the IRGC ranks. Iran's "Qods Force" – the arm of the IRGC that works with militant organizations abroad and promotes terrorism overseas – often works closely with the Lebanese Hizballah in its operations outside Lebanon.⁵²

63. There is always speculation that Iran's leadership does not fully control individual components of its security organizations such as the IRGC and the Qods Force. Although in individual instances this is undoubtedly true, in a broader sense this is false: the organization is deeply integrated into the regime's leadership. The IRGC commander reports directly to Iran's Supreme Leader, and the organization often works in conjunction with other arms of the Iranian government. Indeed, in some instances the IRGC is the most important voice in determining Iran's foreign policy. In 2010, General David Petraeus, who heads U.S. military forces in the

⁵² For a review, see Ray Takeyh, *Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs* (Oxford, 2009).

Middle East, testified that Iran's Revolutionary Guard "controls Iranian foreign policy in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza and influences heavily [sic] in Afghanistan and the Gulf Region."⁵³

64. Many of Iran's leaders come from IRGC ranks, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As informal ties are incredibly important in Iran – personal relations and informal power are often more important than an individual's former position – this IRGC background serves as an additional source of interaction with regime leaders.

65. It is possible that some of the individuals belonging to al-Qa'ida transiting Iran or residing in Iran are doing so with the help of Iranian security officials who have been bribed, who have their own agendas, or who otherwise are acting on their own. But the pattern of contacts, which has continued for twenty years and, since 9/11, has been the subject of tremendous U.S. and international scrutiny, indicates this is an ongoing relationship that has the sanction of Iran's government. Iran's senior leadership is clearly informed of the status of al-Qa'ida members in the country or has chosen to remain deliberately ignorant. In my judgment, there is almost no chance that "rogue" elements could form a lasting policy on this subject without sanction.

66. Ironically, the hostility between Iran and much of the Sunni jihadist movement, and between Iran and the Taliban regime (and now resistance movement) in Afghanistan, also suggests the likelihood of senior leadership support for the relationship. Simply put, helping maintain sustained relations would be too politically sensitive for any individual to risk without getting top-level cover. Moreover, the constant U.S. and Arab regime demand that these individuals be surrendered to justice is another reason for Iran's senior leadership to be informed of the nature of any relationship.

⁵³ Statement of General David H. Petraeus.

X. Conclusion

67. The ambiguity in our understanding of this relationship is not just due to data limits, but also due to how Iran has structured its links to many terrorist groups. Tehran – like many other sponsors of terrorism – recognize that it is best served by such an ambiguous relationship. If there is no hint of ties, then Iran’s enemies will not be afraid, and it is difficult to use the relationship as a threat. Moreover, over time some word usually trickles out. At the same time, being able to hide the details of relationships gives Iran deniability and helps it escape being tarred by al-Qa’ida’s brush or that of other terrorist groups. In particular, it complicates efforts to retaliate militarily and diplomatically against Iran. For example, former U.S. National Security Advisor Samuel (“Sandy”) Berger described Iran’s role in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing as such: “We know it was done by the Saudi Hizballah. We know that they were trained in Iran by Iranians. We know there was Iranian involvement. What has yet to be established is how substantial the Iranian involvement was.”⁵⁴ Such cloudiness makes it difficult to rally allies against Iran and to gain domestic and international support for punitive military action.

68. In sum, in my expert opinion, there is strong support for the view of the 9/11 Commission that additional investigation by the U.S. government into Iranian support for al-Qa’ida and terrorism in general is necessary.⁵⁵

69. In sum, in my judgment there is strong support for claim that Iran has provided important material support for al-Qa’ida including direct travel facilitation for the so-called “muscle hijackers” as noted in the *9/11 Commission Report*. This support comes from a range of sources, including U.S. government documents and even statements by al-Qa’ida


⁵⁴ As quoted in Gary Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism,” *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003), p. 88.

leaders. This support is not consistent or unqualified, but over the years it has helped make al-Qa'ida the formidable organization it was on 9/11 and remains today.

Further the Affiant Sayeth Not.

This Affidavit is comprised of 69 separately numbered paragraphs.

I, **DANIEL L. BYMAN**, being duly sworn, do hereby swear and affirm under penalty of perjury that the contents of this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.


Daniel L. Byman

Sworn to before me this the 8th day of June, 2010, in Washington, D.C.



Notary Public

EDDIE PALMER
NOTARY PUBLIC DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
My Commission Expires 09/14/2014

EXHIBIT A

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, 2005-present.

Direct the largest and most comprehensive masters-level security studies program in the United States with over 300 students from around the world. Supervise budget of over \$6 million and raise money for the Center and Program. Manage staff of 12; core faculty of 12; and over 70 adjunct faculty. Oversee curriculum, fundraising, admissions, book projects, directed research, and several speaker series.

Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) and Department of Government, Georgetown University,
(Associate Professor, 2005-2009)
(Assistant Professor, SFS only, 2003-2005).

Teach classes on terrorism, Middle East security, and other national security issues. Research includes U.S. counterterrorism strategy, terrorism in the Middle East, Persian Gulf security, U.S. uses of force, and the management of internal conflict.

Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, 2003-present
Conduct research and offer expertise on terrorism, Iraq, and various Middle East security issues.

Lecturer, U.S. Military Academy Counterterrorism Center, 2007-present.
Teach class sessions for law enforcement, FBI, and other government officials on issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism, with a focus on Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

Professional Staff Member, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States
(The "9/11 Commission"), 2003-2004.
Conducted research and offered expertise on U.S. counterterrorism policy, with particular attention to U.S. foreign relations with the Middle East, intelligence gathering, and covert action.

Professional Staff Member. Joint 9/11 Inquiry, U.S. House and Senate Intelligence Committees, 2001-2002
Led team responsible for assessing U.S. intelligence agencies' efforts against terrorism since 1986. Identified systemic problems in the intelligence community, and recommended changes to avoid future calamities. Organized hearings and briefed Members of Congress.

Policy Analyst and Director for Research, Center for Middle East Public Policy, The RAND Corporation, 1997-2002.
Led teams and conducted research on a range of Middle East security and political issues. Provided area expertise for functional experts working on the Middle East. Directed, managed, and researched studies for U.S. policy makers and military officers. Led research teams of 5-30 people. Administered budgets between \$100,000 and \$2,000,000. Briefed senior U.S. policy and military officials on research results.

Political Analyst. Central Intelligence Agency, 1990-1993
Lead political analyst on several Middle Eastern countries. Analyzed the domestic politics, political stability, and foreign policies of Middle East states for U.S. government policy makers.

EDUCATION

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. in political science, 1997.

Major fields: International Relations, Comparative Politics, and Near East Studies
Middlebury College Arabic Language Program, Summer 1994

Amherst College, B.A. comparative religion, 1989

Honors: *magna cum laude*, Kellogg Prize for public speaking and Moseley Prize
for scholarship in comparative religion

Hamilton College Academic Program in Spain, Fall 1987

BOOKS

A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2011)

The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Wiley and Sons, 2008), 304 pages.

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The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge University Press, 2002; co-authored with Matthew Waxman), 281 pages.

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